Context. A deployed model changes the data it will next be trained on: a credit score changes who defaults, and a fraud model changes what fraud looks like. Practice retrains, but nobody had said what repeated retraining converges to, or when. Perdomo et al. (2020) model the effect as a distribution map , fixed over time, which turns the question into a fixed-point problem; Miller et al. (2021) then ask when the risk on the induced data can be minimized directly, and how. Retraining is best-response iteration, and it converges when the product of three sensitivities is less than one: the data move by per unit of model change (in ), the loss gradient moves by per unit of data change, and the minimizer moves by per unit of gradient change. The limit is a stable point, a model optimal for the data it causes. In game terms that is a Nash condition, where the learner takes the data as given; the performative optimum, which internalizes the response, is the learner's Stackelberg point. The two can be far apart, because the risk on induced data is the diagonal of a two-argument function, and retraining sees only one of its derivatives.
Setting. Models are , closed and convex, and instances are . The performative risk is , and the decoupled risk separates the model that generated the data from the model being scored. A performative optimum minimizes ; is performatively stable if . Repeated risk minimization (RRM) iterates , so stable points are its fixed points. The assumptions are -sensitivity, ; -joint smoothness, -Lipschitz in and in ; and -strong convexity in . Miller et al. add mixture dominance, that is convex, which holds for any loss when is linear in and for any loss convex in when is a location-scale family, with zero-mean and linear. The running example is a coin: , , predictor , squared loss. The supervised answer is , the stable point is , and since the optimum is : pushing the coin's bias toward 0 or 1 also lowers the Bernoulli variance in the predictor's loss, an effect the stable point ignores.
Theorems on retraining (Perdomo et al.). If is -jointly smooth and -strongly convex and is -sensitive, then so for RRM converges linearly to the unique stable point, and each assumption is needed: for every RRM can fail without strong convexity, without joint smoothness, or with both but . Repeated gradient descent (RGD), one projected step per deployment, also contracts to the stable point if and ; as this is , below RRM's , and whether the gap is real is left open. With fresh samples per round and , empirical RRM enters and stays in a -ball around with probability .
Theorems on stable versus optimal points. (Perdomo et al.) If is -Lipschitz in and -strongly convex and is -sensitive, every stable point and every optimum satisfy with no smoothness and no , so the bound holds even where retraining diverges. In strategic classification, where is the law of best-responding agents, the Stackelberg equilibrium is exactly the performative optimum. (Miller et al.) The bound is often vacuous, because grows with the size of : for any there is a -strongly convex instance whose unique stable point maximizes , with gap at least . If is -strongly convex and -smooth in , is -sensitive and mixture dominance holds, is -convex, sharply. For a location-scale family and a loss also -strongly convex in , is -convex with which can be positive at any . For a location family with unknown , a two-stage method (estimate from random deployments, then minimize the plug-in risk) has excess risk with probability , so samples suffice against for derivative-free convex optimization.
Retraining contracts because strong convexity turns a small change in the gradient into a small move of the minimizer. Fix and write . Strong convexity of around its minimizer plus first-order optimality of for give The right side is one function integrated against two nearby laws; joint smoothness makes -Lipschitz in , so Kantorovich-Rubinstein and sensitivity bound it by , and Banach's fixed-point theorem completes the proof. Read the constant as in the implicit function theorem: inverse Hessian () times the cross-derivative of the gradient in the data () times the data's response to the model ().
Every assumption is needed, and the threshold is sharp. Each counterexample uses point-mass data moving linearly with and drops one assumption. Without strong convexity, the linear loss on with gives , so and RRM flips between for every : the argmin of a merely convex function jumps when the data move a little. Without smoothness, a large hinge term makes the minimizer jump through the kink and RRM cycles. At the threshold, squared loss with gives , slope exactly ; for the stable point exists but repels. The loss makes the threshold sharp at every ratio (my note, not in the paper). In static learning strong convexity speeds up convergence; here, without it, retraining need not converge at all.
One gradient step per deployment also contracts, by co-coercivity of the gradient. Split the change in the expected gradient into a part from moving the model and a part from moving the data. The data part is at least by the vector form of Kantorovich-Rubinstein. The model part is bounded below by co-coercivity of smooth strongly convex functions, and the spare squared-gradient term absorbs the term of the expansion when . The step differentiates the loss with the data frozen and never differentiates through , so its fixed points satisfy the first-order condition for at , which is stability: RGD finds stable points, the same targets as RRM.
Finite samples cost a factor of 2 in the threshold, through a triangle inequality in . Rerun Step 1 with the empirical law, using The Fournier-Guillin rate makes the first term at most once , with a union bound over rounds; outside the -ball the sampling error is smaller than the shift, so the iterate contracts at rate , and inside it stays. The is the curse of dimensionality of empirical , inherited from the proof route.
Stable and optimal points are close, by sandwiching one decoupled risk. Compare the two points on the stable point's own data, with . Optimality gives ; stability plus strong convexity gives ; Kantorovich-Rubinstein gives . Together, The result compares two points and says nothing about dynamics, which is why it needs neither smoothness nor . Existence of a stable point (for compact , an -sensitive map and a convex loss Lipschitz in ) is Kakutani applied to , with Berge's maximum theorem for upper hemicontinuity. The concave coin (, where ) shows the asymmetry: RRM converges there, while is nonconvex, so stable points are easy to find and optima can be hard. For smooth, Lipschitz, convex losses without strong convexity, adding with makes RRM converge to a point with on a of diameter 1.
The gradient of has two terms, and retraining sees only one. With a density for , Stable points zero the first term; optima zero the sum. The second term is the leader's correction for how the followers respond, and it needs to know how moves, which deployed data alone do not reveal. Retraining can fail even on an easy problem: with and , is convex for every with optimum 0, yet retraining runs and diverges for .
A stable point can be the maximizer, because the cross term can outweigh the curvature. Take a point mass at and . Then Retraining maps , so for the unique stable point is 0, and for it is the unique maximizer of . On retraining, and the stochastic-gradient methods built on it, converge to the worst model. In derivatives, , , : retraining's slope is and the diagonal curvature is , the two thresholds side by side. The distance bound gives nothing here, since .
Under mixture dominance the diagonal is convex up to twice the cross term. Use the first-order characterization of -convexity and absorb each gradient term with one convexity. Mixture dominance makes convex, which bounds the score term by ; strong convexity of handles the direct term. What is left is one gradient direction integrated against two laws, by Kantorovich-Rubinstein, and collecting terms gives . The factor 2 relative to retraining is the of the diagonal: retraining uses the cross term once, as a shift of the minimizer, while the curvature along the diagonal counts it from both arguments.
In location-scale families the moving coordinates add their own curvature, which can cancel . Mixture dominance comes from the convex order: by Strassen's theorem it suffices to build a martingale coupling, and pushing through the affine map to a randomly chosen endpoint is one, by linearity of and . If is -strongly convex in , the convex-order gap is the variance of the martingale step, so , while the synchronous coupling bounds the cross term by . AM-GM then cancels the cross term against the new curvature and leaves , whatever the size of the response; keeping the bound instead gives the second entry of . A stronger response moves the data further, and when the loss is curved in those coordinates, the extra movement adds curvature. For and , for every , yet the stable point is and the optimum .
Estimating the map supplies the missing gradient term, at a parametric rate. Deploying gives a regression , and least squares gives ; deploying gives clean draws of , so simulates for any offline, which is certainty equivalence. For the error, strong convexity gives the Polyak-Lojasiewicz bound ; the gradient splits into model error, of squared size , and optimization error of the plug-in minimizer, which inherits strong convexity by Weyl's inequality and has excess risk by a stability bound plus Markov's inequality (hence the poor dependence). The comparison with zeroth-order methods counts samples only; random and null deployments are costly when the response is adversarial.
In simulations the convergence condition is conservative, and the two-stage method is unaffected by a strong response. On a credit-scoring dataset with three strategic features, agents shift them by and the learner fits regularized logistic regression. In Perdomo et al., RRM converges in a few rounds for small and diverges for large, RGD likewise but more slowly, while the sufficient condition holds only at for RRM and never for RGD, so it is very conservative. In Miller et al., when the response is strong (), retraining-based SGD stalls far from the optimum, a derivative-free method slows or fails, and the two-stage method is essentially unaffected; on the credit simulator it converges within a few thousand samples where the derivative-free method has not converged after a million. At Miller et al. read an accuracy gap as stable points being worse than optima, but a short bound puts any stable point within 0.02 of the optimal regularized logistic loss, so the gap more likely reflects SGD runs short of their own limit (my note, not in the paper).
Consequences and limits. Retraining is an equilibrium-seeking dynamic: it settles when the model's strong convexity exceeds the product of how far the data move and how strongly the gradient reacts, so regularization stabilizes the loop and a merely convex or nonsmooth learner (a hard margin, a thresholded rule) can cycle at any sensitivity. Its limit is a Nash point, and a stable point can be the worst model; reaching the leader's optimum takes the derivative through , which means estimating the response. Retraining also ignores anything that depends only on the induced distribution: a convex penalty on, say, the induced fraud rate leaves every stable point unchanged, while the two-stage recipe can target it. The limits are in the map, a fixed memoryless function of the current model: the population responds instantly and completely, carries no state and does not anticipate the next retrain, the learner sees labeled draws from , and Miller's guarantees add a location family with every agent shifting by the same , exploration by random and null deployments, and no misspecification. Agents who forecast the learner, or know they are being measured, turn the map into an equilibrium object.
Terms
- Distribution map: the law of the data once model is deployed; fixed over time.
- and
- , with ; curvature .
- Performatively stable
- : optimal for its own data; a fixed point of retraining (Nash in game terms).
- Performative optimum
- ; in strategic classification, the Stackelberg equilibrium with the learner leading.
- RRM / RGD
- Retraining to the minimizer, or one gradient step with data frozen; both converge to stable points, RRM at rate .
- vs
- Retraining contracts below the first; PR is guaranteed convex below the second (both sharp).
- Bound on the distance between any stable point and any optimum; needs no smoothness.
- Mixture dominance
- convex: the law at a convex combination is dominated by the mixture under the loss.
- Convexity level that holds for any sensitivity when the loss is curved in the moving coordinates.
- Score term
- : the part of through that retraining omits.
Quiz
- With the linear loss on and , RRM oscillates for every . What is the mechanism?is minimized at , a discontinuous function of the data. Without strong convexity the argmin is not Lipschitz in the distribution, so no smallness of helps; the stable point 0 exists but is never reached.
- Why does repeated gradient descent converge to a stable point rather than to the performative optimum?The RGD fixed point satisfies the first-order condition for at (zero gradient in the interior), which is stability. has a second term through the dependence of on , and only optima make the full sum vanish.
- Retraining contracts for , but convexity of is only guaranteed for . Where does the factor 2 come from?Retraining's slope is , at most . The diagonal's curvature is , and with only from mixture dominance this needs .
- The platform adds a convex penalty on the induced data (say, on the fraud rate) to its loss. What happens to retraining's limit?Stable points solve , and is constant in . Only a method that anticipates how moves can act on such a term.
Sources
- Juan C. Perdomo, Tijana Zrnic, Celestine Mendler-Dünner, and Moritz Hardt. Performative Prediction. ICML, 2020.
- John Miller, Juan C. Perdomo, and Tijana Zrnic. Outside the Echo Chamber: Optimizing the Performative Risk. ICML, 2021.